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Abstract
In this paper, we develop a duopolistic model of legislative lobbying. Two lobbies
compete to inuence the votes of a group of legislators who have a concern for both
social welfare and campaign contributions. The type of a legislator is the relative
weight he places on social welfare as compared to money. We study the equilibria
of this lobbying game under political certainty and uncertainty and examine under
which circumstances the policy is socially e¢ cient, and how much money has been
invested in the political process ?. A special attention is paid to three primitives of
the environment : the intensity of the competition between the lobbies, the internal
organization of the legislature and the proportion of bad and good legislators in the
political arena.
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1 Introduction
In all real polities, special interest groups or lobbies1 participate actively in the policymaking
process. An analytical apparatus has been developed aiming to provide a description of the
channels through which the inuence of these interest groups is exerted and a characterization
of the main features of the equilibrium policies when this inuence is accounted for. A
common denominator of the research done in the last decade2 on that topic has been to study
structural models of the political process : economic and political actors behave rationally
within well-specied economic and political institutions, where the policymaking process is
formulated as an extensive form game. Methodologically, much progress has been made
relatively to the traditional approaches, which were often based on inconsistent or irrational
political and economic behavior, relying on non-derived inuence functions, political support
functions, or vote functions. While this new literature does not point out a single canonical
model that would impose itself againsts its competitors, it is fair to say the the description of
the competitive process among special interest groups as a common agency game (Bernheim
and Whinston (1986)) has become a contender3. In this formulation, the principals are the
lobbyists and the common agent is an incumbent politician depicted as having the power of
selecting unilaterally the economic policy. The lobbyists move rst : they, simultaneously
or sequentially, o¤er to the common agent a menu of monetary payments conditional on
the policy that will be ultimately selected. After contemplating the prole of o¤ers, the
politician decides which policy to select.
The anecdotical and empirical evidence is quite contrasted. Documenting that money
a¤ect policy outcomes is not an easy task. Indeed, as formulated by Grossman and Helpman
(2001) "After all, it is di¢ cult to know what a bill would have looked like absent the net
e¤ect of contributions. Even if we focus on roll-call votes, as many researchers have done,
the e¤ort is confounded by the counterfactual : how would a legislator have voted absent the
contributions ? Perhaps a representatives vote on a bill was dictated by a concern for jobs
in his district, which happens to be associated with the economic health of a contributor,
1It is not an easy task to dene what is a special interest group (see Grossman and Helpman (2001) s
discussion on the matter). here we even use interchangeably the terms special interest groups and lobbies
meaning that we ignore all the potential di¢ culties that a group may face to get some identity, and gives
rise to a political organization/representation which is e¢ cient. Not all groups are equal in that respect as
suggested and investigated by Olson (1965). In this paper we skip this important aspect of the lobbying
process known as the Olsonian program to focus on some other dimansions.
2See, for instance, Grossman and Helpman (2001) and Persson (1998).
3Laussel and Le Breton (2001) explore the structure of equilibrium payo¤s. The common agency frame-
work has been pionnered by Grossman and Helpman (1994)(2001) and followers to study trade policy,
commodity taxation and other policies.
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such as a large corporation. Or simply, the legislator was following the directives of party
leaders". Variables should be introduced to control for these di¤erents e¤ects; for instance the
legislators ideological stance is reected by his ratings with political organizations. Baldwin
and Magee (2000) found that that the probability of a vote in favor of trade liberalization on
the NAFTA and GATT Uruguay Round bills increases with the amount of contributions that
a legislator receives from business interests and felt with the amount collected from labor
unions. Stratmann (2003) studied the congressional votes on nancial services legislation
and conclude that contributions have changed voting behavior. These papers are just two
examples of an antire genre of research4 and several other authors have reached di¤erent,
when not opposite conclusions. In the process of their analysis of the Tullocks (1972) puzzle
about the little amount of money invested in U.S. politics, Ansolobehere, De Figueiredo
and Snyder (2003) conclude that there is no econometric evidence that contributions have
substantial e¤ects on votes and legislative decisions and suggest an alternative explanation.
We depart from this literature in abandoning the assumption that policies are set by a
single individual or by a cohesive, well-disciplined political party. In reality, most policy
decisions, are made not by one person but by a group of elected representatives acting as a
legislative body. Even when the legislature5 is controlled by a single party (as it is necessarily
the case in a two-party system if the legislature consists of a unique chamber6), the delegation
members do not always follow the instructions of their party leaders. In situations with
multiple independent legislators, special interest groups face a subtle problem in deciding
how to allocate their resources to inuence policy choices. For instance, should the lobby seek
to solidify support among those legislators who would be inclined to support its positions
anyway, or should it seek to win over those who might otherwise be hostile to its views ?
The answer to this question and others like it depend on the rules of the legislative process
i.e. the optimal strategy for wielding inuence will vary with the institutional setting.
Many formal models of the legislative process have been developed by social scientists.
The extensive game form describes the sequence of decision/information nodes of the legis-
lators where a decision node typically consists in either the proposal of an alternative (there,
the legislator acts as an agenda setter) or in expressing an opinion on a proposal (there, the
4Smith (1995) cites more than 35 studies poublished between 1980 and 1992 that attempted to explain roll-
call votes in the U.S. Congress by campaign contributions from interested parties and by various indicatorss
of a legislators ideology.
5Like Diermeier and Myerson (1999), by legislators we mean here all individuals who have a constitutional
role in the process of passing legislation. This may include individuals from what is usually refered to as
being the executive branch like for instance the president or the vice-president.
6If instead, the legislature gives some power to actors from the "executive" branch then, this assertion
does not necessarily holds true in case of divided government.
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legislator acts as a voter). To each terminal node is attached a policy and the model of the
legislative process is likely to depend upon the type of policy space which is considered. A
classical model in that vein is the Baron-Ferejohn bargaining model (1989) describing the
rules of the legislature to divide a xed budget among the legislators. This legislative model
has been paired with lobbying by Helpman and Persson (2001). Another very nice such
model, due to Grossman and Helpman (2001), applies to any nite set of policies with one
policy playing the role of the status quo. In their model, one legislator decides unilaterally
upon an alternative (bill, amendement, motion, reform,...) that will confronted through a
binary majority vote to the status quo. Lobbies have the opportunity to inuence legislators
in two occasions : rst they will try to exert inuence on the agenda setter and second they
will also try to buy votes. In this paper, we focus on the binary setting i.e. we assume
that the7 policy space consists of two alternatives : the status quo (alternative 0) versus the
change or reform (alternative 1). While simplistic, we think that many policy issues t that
formulation like for instance : to ratify or not a free-trade agreement, to forbid or not a free
market for guns, to allow or not abortion. In such case, there is no room for agenda setting
and the unique role of the legislature is to select one of the two options through voting. A
legislature is then just described by a simple game (N;W) where N is the set of legislators
(or parties, if there is some strong party discipline) and W is the list of winning coalitions :
the reform is adopted if and only if the coalition of legislators voting for the reform belongs
to that list.
Lobby 0 (respectively lobby 1) preference is dened by the amount of dollarsW0 (respec-
tivelyW1) that would be lost (respectively gained) by its members if the reform was adopted
and we asumme that both lobbies represent faithfully the two sides of the society on the is-
sue uner scrutiny. Following Grosssman and Helpman (1994), we assume that each legislator
seeks to maximize a weighted sum of social welfare and monetary contributions. Therefore,
in this setting, each legislator i is simply described by a single parameter i denoting the
weight that he puts on social welfare. This will be refered hereafter as being the type of the
legislator. The lower is i, the cheapest is legislator i and therefore there is a sense in which
we can qualify politicians with a low  as bador corrupted politicians since they are more
willing to depart from social welfare when deciding upon which policy to implement8.
7The idea that  could be an adverse selection parameter is suggested in Grossman and Helpman (1992)
and is the main motivation of Le Breton and Salanié (2003).
8Some empirical estimates of this parameter have been provided in the common agency setting. Interest-
ingly, Golberg and Maggi (1999) nd that the 1983 U.S. pattern of protection is consistent with the model of
Grossman and Helpman and estimate the value of the parameter  to be between 50 and 88, a surprisingly
high range of values. Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) also conclude that the model of Grossman and
Helpman is consistent with the data but estimate the value of  to be between 3 and 8. Bradford (2001)
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The main purpose of our paper is to proceed to an equilibrium analysis of the lobbying
game where the two lobbies make rst o¤ers to the legislators who then vote in favor or
against the reform. Several variants of this game are examined in turn. In the rst part, we
assume that the types of the legislator are common knowledge, an environment that we call
political certainty as all the relevant variables are known with certainty by all the players. In
the second part, we assume instead that the types of the legislators are private informations.
We refer to this environment as political uncertainty as the lobbies when buying votes and
the legislators when voting do not know with certainty the consequences of their choices. In
both cases, we assume that the two lobbies move simultaneously. The exogeneous ingredients
of our strategic environment are :
 The economic stakesW0 andW1 whose respective magnitudes will dene the intensity of
the competition. We assume here that the reform is the socially e¢ cient policy i.e. W1  W0
and the ratio W1
W0
 1 will be called the e¢ ciency threshold.
 The simple game (N;W) which describes the legislative process.
 A probability distribution F over the positive real line which describes the respective
frequencies of bad and good legislators.
We aim to examine the impact of each of these key parameters on the nal equilibrium
outcome of the political mechanism described by this inuence game. The outcome has two
dimensions :
 The policy which is ultimately selected by the legislators.
 The ex ante monetary o¤ers of the lobbies to the legislators and their ex post imple-
mentation.
In the rst part of the paper, we assume political certainty. In the case of pure strategies,
we demonstrate that the equilibrium policy is e¢ cient but we note also that existence is
obtained only under very stringent conditions on (N;W). We examine the equilibrium in
mixed strategies in a specic majority setting and comment the relationship to the literature
on Colonel Blotto Games
In the second part of the paper, we move to the case of political uncertainty and limit
our attention to the majority legislative process. The lobbying game is much more intricate
as solving the continuation voting subgames gives rise to reduced payo¤ functions for the
lobbies which may display some irregularities. We rst examine the case where only lobby 0
is active and explore its optimal lobbying strategy. Once again the e¢ ciency threshold plays
proceeds to an empirical investigation of a variant of a model of Grossman and Helpman where politicians
maximize votes and nds that politicians weight a dollar of campaign contributions about 15% more than a
dollar of national income. This would lead to a value of  very close to 1.
5
a critical role in explaining the feature of this strategy and the probability of getting the
e¢ cient policy selected. One surprising feature of the optimal o¤er is that the larger is the
stake W0 of lobby 0, the smaller is the coalition of legislators who receive an o¤er. In the
last part, we return to the game and o¤er some preliminary insights of the best responses
when there are three legislators.
Related Literature
Many of the questions examined in this paper have been investigated by other authors.
Some general positive models aiming to describe the lobbying process of a legislature have
been proposed by Bennedsen and Feldmann (2002), Boylan (2002), Helpman and Persson
(2001), Polborn (2002) and Snyder (1991) among many more. Some recent papers by Dal
Bo (2002) and Felgenhauer and Gruner (2004) look at the impact of external inuence on a
legislature or committee from a mechanism design angle. In particular, they compare open
and closed voting and reach interesting conclusions. Instead of us, they model the committee
choice issue as a problem with common values as in Condorcet juries.
In contrast to Le Breton and Zaporozhets (2007), this paper assume that the lobbies
make their o¤ers simultaneously. Several important contributions have assumed instead
that they move sequentially. This formulation removes the existence issue9. Groseclose and
Snyder (1996) consider a sequential game where the two lobbies move in sequence and the
bidding process stops when the second mover has reacted to the o¤er of the rst mover. They
examine the majority game with an heterogeneous legislature and look at the equilibrium
size of the coalition of legislators who receive an o¤er from the lobby moving rst. Banks
(2000) pursues this line of investigation while Diermeier and Myerson (1999) assume instead
a homogeneous legislature but an arbitrary simple game. They focus on the architecture of
the legislative process that would maximize monetary o¤ers. Dekel, Jackson and Wolinsky
(2006a,b) examine an open-ended sequential game where lobbies alternate in increasing their
o¤ers to legislators. By allowing lobbies to keep responding to each other with counter-
o¤ers, their game eliminates the asymmetry and the resulting second mover advantage of
the Groseclose and Snyder s game. Several settings are considered depending upon the type
of o¤ers that lobbies can make to legislators ( Up-front payments versus promises contingent
upon the voting outcome) and upon the role played by budget constraints10. The di¤erence
9Prat and Rustichini (2000) present a general abstract model extending the common agency framework
as it has many principals (lobbies here) and many agents (legislators here). It does not cover our behavioral
model . Further, in our case, a direct check is more e¢ cient than an application of their balancedness
condition.
10These considerations which are irrelevant in the case of our two-round sequential game are important in
their game.
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in the budgets of the lobbies plays a critical role in determining which lobby is successful
when lobbies are budget constrained, and the di¤erence in their wilingness to pay plays an
important role when they are not budget constrained. When lobbies are budget constrained,
their main result states that the winning lobby is the one whose budget plus half of the
sum of the value that each legislator attaches to voting in favor of this lobby exceeds the
corresponding magnitude calculated for the other lobby. In contrast, when lobbies are not
budget constrained, what matter are the lobbiess valuations and the intensity of preferences
of a particular "near-median" group of legislators. The lobby with a-priori minority support
wins when its valuation exceeds the other lobbys valuation by more than a magnitude thant
depends on the preferences of that near-median group.
Young (1978 a, b, c) and Shubik and Young (1978d) were the rst point out the relevance
of the least core and the nucleolus to predict some dimensions of the equilibrium strategies
of the lobbyists.
This literature is also closely related to the popular Colonel Blotto with some di¤erences
however. If the competition among lobbies was modeled as a Colonel Blotto game, then
they would not pay attention to the money spent in the process and focus exclusively on
the probability of winning. Instead here, it is assumed that money is valuabl11. As noted
by Young (1978b)12 "In fact, the real, or net, payo¤s to the lobbyists consist of their payo¤
in the above sense less their expenditures. However, we may imagine for present purposes
that the payo¤ from winning is immeasurably gretater than the lobbyistss budgets". In that
respect the game looks more to a multi-unit all-pay auctions. The value of a bundle of votes
will depend upon the number and identities of the legislators and the money spent will be
lost, irrespective of the outcome. On this last point, it should be noted however, as pointed
out by Dekel, Jackson and Wolinski that several variants are conceivable depending upon
the contingencies upon which the payment is made conditional. In spite of these di¤erences,
the analogy with Colonel Blotto games is instructive. Young (1978) demonstrates that if
the simple game is dictatorial then both lobbies spend the totality of their budgets on the
dictator. He also shows that if there are at least two vetoers, then lobby 0 wins for sure by
playing a di¤use mixed strategy with support the set of vetoers. Surprisingly, he shows that if
there is exactly one vetoer, then the game fails to possess an equilibrium in mixed strategies.
Colonel Blotto Games are notoriously di¢ cult to solve even in the simplest settings. As
noted by Young, when the game admits an equilibriumin mixed strategies, we can calculate
11Shubik and Young (1978) examine a variant that they call the session lobbying game which admits an
equilibrium in pure strategies.
12In (1978a), he writes "It is as if winning or losing is taken to be of incomparably greater value than the
prices paid".
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the expected amount of money received by each legislator. This leads to a price for the vote
of each legislator. The discontinuities displayed by these games are not always covered by
existing theorems. In the case, where they are three legislators deciding under the ordinary
majority rule, equilibria in mixed strategies exist and have been computed explicitely in
the symmetric case. In the asymmetric case, Weinstein (2005) o¤ers insighful results on
the probability of winning of the strongest player. When the monetary cost is included, as
already mentionned, the nature of the game is changed. Kvasov (2007) and Szentes and
Rosenthal (2003a,b) provide results on this class of games in some specic cases.
To the best of our knowledge, the case of political uncertainty has not been investigared
before. Our model follows Le Breton and Salaniés model (2003) of common agency with
adverse selection except that, in contrast to them, we ignore the free-riding dimension of the
lobbying process and its impact on e¢ ciency.
2 The Model
In this section, we describe the main ingredients of the problem as well as the lobbying game
which will constitute our model of vote-buying by lobbyists.
The external forces that seek to inuence the legislature are represented by two players,
whom we will call lobby 0 and lobby 1. Lobby 1 wants the legislature to pass a bill (change,
proposal, reform) that would change some area of law13. Lobby 0 is opposed to this bill
and wants to maintain the status quo. Lobby 0 is willing to spend up to W0 dollars to
prevent passage of the bill while lobby 1 is willing to pay up to W1 dollars to pass the bill.
Sometimes, we will refer to these two policies in competition as being policies 0 and 1. We
will assume that W  W1  W0 > 0 i.e. that policy 1 is the socially e¢ cient policy. The
ratio W1
W0
which is (by assumption) larger than 1 will be called the e¢ ciency threshold. It
measures the intensity of the superiority of the reform as compared to the status quo and
will be used repeatedly in the analysis.
The legislature is described by a simple game14 i.e. a pair (N;W) where N = f1; 2; :::; ng
is the set of legislators and W is the set of winning coalitions. The interpretation is the
following. A bill is adopted if and only if the subset of legislators who voted for the bill
forms a winning coalition. From that perspective, the set of winning coalitions describes
the rules operating in the legislature to make decisions. A coalition C is blocking if NnC
13The framework also covers the case of private bills as dened and analysed by Boylan (2002).
14In social sciences it is sometimes called a committee or a voting game. In computer science, it is called a
quorum system (Holzman, Marcus and Peleg (1997)) while in mathematics, it is called a hypergraph (Berge
(1989), Bollobas(1986)). An excellent reference is Taylor and Zwicker (1999).
8
is not winning : some legislators (at least one) are needed to form a winning coalition. We
will denote by B the subset of blocking coalitions15; from the denition, the status quo is
maintained as soon as the set of legislators who voted against the bill forms a blocking
coalition. The simple game is called strong if B =W16. The set of minimal (with respect to
inclusion) winning (blocking) coalitions will be denotedW m (B m): A legislator is a dummy
if he is not part of any minimal winning coalition while a legislator is a vetoer if he belongs
to all blocking coalitions. A group of legislators forms an oligarchy if a coalition is winning
i¤ it contains that group i.e. each member of the oligarchy is a vetoer and the oligarchy
does not need any extra support to win17 i.e. legislators outside the oligarchy are dummies.
When the oligarchy consists of a single legislator, the game is called dictatorial.
In this paper, all legislators are assumed to act on behalf of social welfare i.e. they will
all vote for policy 1 against policy 0 if no other event interfers with the voting process. In
contrast to Banks (2000) and Groseclose and Snyder (1996), we rule out the existence of
a horizontal heterogeneity across legislators. However, legislators also value money and we
introduce instead some form of vertical heterogeneity. Precisely, we assume that legislators
di¤er among themselves according to their willingness to depart from social welfare. The
type of legislator i, denoted i; is the minimal amount of dollars that he needs to receive in
order to sacrify one dollar of social welfare i.e. Therefore if the policy adopted generates a
level of social welfare equal to W , the payo¤ of legislator i if he receives a transfer ti is:
ti + iW
This payo¤ formulation is compatible with two behavioral assumptions that will be con-
sidered in this paper. Either, the component W appears as long as the legislator has voted
for a policy generating a level of social welfare W regardless of the fact that this policy has
been ultimately selected or not : we will refere to this model, as behavioral model P, where P
stands for procedural. Or, th component W appears as long as the policy ultimately seleted
generates a level of social welfare W regardless of the fact that the legislator has voter for
or againsts this policy : we will refere to this model, as behavioral model C, where C stands
for consequential. In this paper, we focus on the behavioral model C.
To promote passage of the bill, lobby 1 can promise to pay money to individual legislators
conditional on their supporting the bill. Similarly, lobby 0 can promise to pay money to
15In game theory, (N;W) is called the dual game.
16When the simple game is strong, the two competing alternatives are treated equally.
17The ve countries of the security council of the United Nations are vetoers but still do not form an
oligarchy as they need some extra support to make a decision.
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individual legislators conditional on their opposing the bill. We denote by ti0  0 and
ti1  0 the (conditional) o¤ers made to legislator i by lobbies 0 and 1 respectively. The
corresponding n-dimensional vectors will be denoted respectively by t0 and t1.
The timing of actions and events that we consider to describe the lobbying game is the
following18.
1. Nature draws the type of each legislator.
2. Both lobby 0 and lobby 1 make contingent monetary o¤ers to individual legislators.
3. Legislators vote.
4. Payments (if any) are implemented.
This game has n + 2 players. A strategy for a lobby is a vector in <n+. Each legislator
can chose among two (pure) strategies : to oppose or to support the bill.
The game is not fully described as we have not precisely dened yet what are the in-
formations held by the players when they act. In this paper, we will consider two distinct
settings concerning the move of player nature but we assume otherwise that the votes of the
legislators are observable i.e. we assume open voting19. The rst setting to which we will
refer as political certainty corresponds to the case where the vector of legislatorss types is
common knowledge. This informational specication has two implications : rst, the lobbies
know the types of the legislators when making their o¤ers and second each legislator knows
the type of any other legislator when voting. The second setting to which we will refer as
political uncertainty corresponds instead to the case where the type of a legislator is private
information. In such case, not only the lobbies ignore the types of the legislators but each
potential continuation voting subgame is a Bayesian game. This means that there is an
adverse selection feature in the strategic relationship between lobbies and legislators and a
Bayesian feature in the strategic interaction among legislators.
We examine the subgame perfect Nash equilibria20 of this lobbying game. In section 3, we
investigate the case of political certainty. Then, in section 4, we move to the case of political
uncertainty.
18Specic details and assumptions will be provided in due time.
19The comparative analysis of closed(secret) versus open voting is the subject of several contributions
among which Dal Bo (2002) and Felgenhauer and Grüner (2004).
20In the case of political uncertainty, the ultimate subgame is truly a Bayesian game that we solve using
Bayesian-Nash equilibria. We dont use the word Bayesian subgame perfect Nash equilibrium as there is no
updating operation of beliefs in our game.
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3 Political Certainty
In this section, we consider the case where the vector (1; 2; ::::; n) of legislatorss types
is common knowledge and, without loss of generality, we assume that 1  2  :::  n..
We rst examine the set of subgame perfect Nash equilibria in pure strategies that we call
compactly (with a slight abuse in the terminology) Nash equilibria. We show that they are
e¢ cient but exist only under very stringent conditions. We conclude by looking specically
at the case of the majority game with three legislators and calculate the Nash equilibrium
in mixed strategies under some specic conditions.
3.1 Nash Equilibria in Pure Strategies
Let (t0; t1) 2 <n+<n+ be a prole of lobbying strategies. In the continuation voting subgame,
each legislators behavior strongly depends on whether he is pivotal or not. Consider a
legislator who expects to be non-pivotal, i.e. who expects that the outcome does not change
no matter which policy he votes for. Then, such a legislator votes in favor of the policy
preferred by the lobby that o¤ers the largest monetary payment. If legislator i believes that
he is not decisive, he votes for policy 1 if and only if
ti1  ti0 (1)
and for policy 0 otherwise.
If instead, legislator i thinks that he is pivotal, he votes for 1 if and only if
iW + ti1  ti0 (2)
and for policy 0 otherwise. Clearly, a legislator with no o¤ers from lobby 0 votes for policy1.
The rst result asserts that under complete information only the e¢ cient policy is chosen
at equilibrium21.
Proposition 1 All Nash equilibria in pure strategies are Pareto e¢ cient.
Proof : Suppose on the contrary that there is a Nash equilibrium (t0; t

1) for which policy
0 is chosen. Let N0 be the coalition of voters supporting policy 0. Then, N0 2 B.
21Some readers may be surprised by the fact that we dont need to rene the set of Nash equilibria to reach
that conclusion. In the common agency setting, Bernheim and Whinston (1986) use the thruthful renement
to rule our ine¢ cient Nash equilibria. But such a renement is not needed here as we have only two possible
decisions.
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Case 1 : N0 2 Bm. Then, each agent in this set is pivotal. Therefore, for any i 2 N0 (2)
are satised. Any agent i 2 N1 is not pivotal and (1) should be satised. The net payo¤ of
lobby 0 is W0 
P
i2N0 t

i0 while the net payo¤ of lobby 1 is  
P
i2N1 t

i1. Lobby 1 could pay 0
to all legislators in N1 and gets 0 instead of a negative payo¤. Therefore in such equilibrium,
ti1 = 0 for all i 2 N1, and from (1) ti0 = 0 for all i2 N1.
Therefore, both lobbies 0 and 1 make o¤ers only to the legislators in N0.
Next, if the inequalities (2) are strict, for each i, ti0 > 0 since the left-hand side is non-
negative. Lobby 0 could reduce his transfer slightly without changing the outcome. Thus,
the equalities must hold. Summing up these equalities for all i 2 N0 we getX
i2N0
ti1 =
X
i2N0
ti0  W
X
i2N0
i  W0  W
X
i2N0
i < W1
Since
P
i2N0 t

i1 < W1 and t

i0 = 0 for all i 2 N1, lobby 1 could slightly increase its o¤ers
to all i 2 N0 and change the outcome from 0 to 1 in contradiction with our assumption.
Case 2 : N0 =2 Bm. Since none of the legislators from N0 is pivotal, the following holds
true :
ti0  ti1 for all i 2 N0
Then, the arguments used in case 1 apply 
The next proposition exhibits several necessary conditions on such equilibria. While
stringent, these conditions cover the traditional common agency setting.
Proposition 2 Let (t0; t

1) be a Nash equilibrium.
(i) If W
P
i2S n  W 0 for all S 2 Bm, then t1 = 0.
(ii) If bS is an oligarchy and Wi < W0 for all i 2 bS, then t1 = #SW0  W .Pi2bS i
Proof : The proof of (i) follows immediately from the observation that lobby 0 gross
benet is not enough to compensate a minimal blocking coalition of legislators. the proof of
(ii) is also very simple. By proposition 1 the equilibrium is e¢ cient. This implies that each
veto player and therefore each member i of the oligarchy bS must receive at leastW0 Wi.
There is no need to make o¤er to any other player as they are dummies and to pay more the
vetoers as it does not add anything 
Unfortunately, these results are mitigated by the fact that the lobbying game typically
does not possess Nash equilibria in pure strategies. In the case where W is the majority
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game, the lobbying game has the structure of an asymmetric Colonel Blotto game (Gross and
Wagner (1950), Laslier and Picard (2002)) for which it is well known that Nash equilibria
in pure strategies does not exist as soon as the asymmetry is too small. In this literature,
the two competitors are constrained by their budgets while here there are no such nancial
constraints. Note however that as long as we consider pure strategies, none of the lobby will
spend more that its gross benet and will spend the totality of this gross benet if this can
prevent the other lobby to win. This equivalence does not hold in the case of mixed strategies.
While discontinuous, this games admit equilibria in mixed strategies; some features of these
equilibria are described in subsection 3.3.
If the asymmetry between the lobbyists is large enough, existence of an equilibrium in
pure strategies follows. It is immediate to see that if W
P
i2S n  W 0, (t0; t1) = (0; 0)
is a Nash equilibrium. The second part of proposition 2 generalizes Le Breton and Salanié
(2003) who consider the common agency framework i.e. the case of a dictatorial simple
game. In that case, a Nash equilibrium always exists as we have assumed W1 > W0: the
unique dictator receives W0 from lobby 1. When there are least two vetoers in the oligarchy,
existence is not guaranted. Consider the case where N = bS =f1; 2g ; 1 = 2 = 0 and
W1 < 2W0: From proposition 2 (ii), we deduce that t1 = 2W0 which is not an equilibrium
behavior as W1 < 2W0.
In fact, this logical argument against existence of a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies
applies to any simple game which is not oligarchic. let (t0; t

1) be a Nash equilibrium. From
proposition 1, the reform is selected. This implies that a winning coalition S of legislators
votes for the reform. Therefore lobby 0 does not implement any monetary o¤er. This means
that ti0   ti1 < iW for all i 2 N . We deduce that there is at most a minimal winning
coalition T  S such that ti1 > 0. Since for all i =2 T; ti1 = 0; we deduce that ti0 = 0
for all such i as none of these legislators is pivotal. Further since the simple game is not
oligarchic, there is a minimal winning coalition di¤erent from T . Let T 0 be any such coalition
and ti1 = 0 for all i 2 (NnT ) \ T 0 and must be minimal winning, as any additional o¤er
would useless but accepted. we deduce from that observation and the previous claim that
ti1 = t

i1   " for some small enough for all i 2 T \ T 0. From the construction, legislators in
T 0 vote for the reform. Since the cost of t1 is smaller than the cost attached to the strategy
t1, we contradict our assumption that (t

0; t

1) is a Nash equilibrium.
Given the di¢ culty to obtain existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies; we consider,
as suggested by Grossman and Helpman (2001), the possibility for the lobbyists to randomize
over their monetary transfers. In contrast to the sequential version which is an alternative
way to remove the existence issue but which o¤ers a strong adavantage to the second mover,
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randomization may help in maintaining some balance between the strategic powers of the two
competitors. To verify if this assertion holds true in full generality turns to be an extremely
demanding technical task . In the case where 1 = 2 = 3 = 0, as already pointed out, the
game is a colonel Blotto game, a discontinuous game for which, however, equilbria in mixed
strategies exist and have been calculated. In the simple proposition below, we illustrate the
di¤erence between the two settings under the simplifying assumption that the third legislator
(the more costly from the perspective of lobby 0) is too expensive to be condidered. The
competition is then limited to legislators 1 and 2.
Proposition 3 Assume that W (1 + 2)  W 0 < W3. Then, a mixed-strategy equi-
librium exists with the following features. Lobby 0 makes o¤ers to legislators i = 1; 2 with
the probability that the o¤er to legislator i does not exceed x given by :
F 0i (x) =
(
1  fW0
2W1
for x 2 [0;Wi) ;
W1 fW0=2 i
W 1 x for x 2
h
Wi;Wi + fW0=2i .
Lobby 1 makes an o¤er just to one of the legislators i = 1; 2 with equal probability. The
probability that the o¤er to legislator i is less or equal to x is
F 1i (x) =
x+W i
W0   (x+i) for x 2
h
0; fW0=2i , where fW0 = W0   2X
i=1
Wi.
Proof. A priori any legislator i prefers to vote for policy 1, and to make him indi¤erent
between two policies lobby 0 has to pay Wi. We show that strategies described above
form an equilibrium.
First, consider the choice of lobby 1. Given that lobby 0 is bribing agents i = 1; 2, it
is enough for lobby 1 to bribe just one of these agents to get policy 1. Since the highest
amount that lobby 0 can o¤er to legislator i is i + fW0=2, lobby 1 will never o¤er more
than fW0=2. It remains to show that lobby 1 randomizes among the transfers on the intervalh
0; fW0=2i, i.e. the group is indi¤erent among these alternatives.
Suppose that lobby 1 make positive o¤er x to legislator 1 and zero to legislator 2. Then
expected payo¤ of lobby 1 given the behavior of lobby 0 is E [U1 jx; 0] = W1F 0i (x+1) x.
Since it is equal toW 1 fW0=2, E [U1 jx; 0] does not depend on x. It is clear that E [U1 jx; 0] =
E [U1 j0; x ]. Therefore, lobby 1 achieves the same expected payo¤ for di¤erent contribution
levels, and it is also indi¤erent between bribing legislator 1 or bribing legislator 2.
Now, lets consider the behavior of lobby 0. It needs to buy at least two votes (simple
majority) to get its preferred outcome. The cheapest way is to bribe legislators 1 and 2.
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For lobby 0, it is a waste of resources to o¤er to legislator i = 1; 2 a positive bribe less than
i, since in that case the legislator would prefer policy 1. If lobby 1 does not make an
o¤er to legislator i, then by o¤ering i lobby 0 makes legislator i indi¤erent between the
two policies. Amount W0  
PK+1
n=1 n can be divided equally between legislators i = 1; 2.
Thus, the maximum possible o¤er is calculated as i + fW0=2. Then, it is necessary to
show that lobby 0 is indi¤erent among the bribes (x; y) with x 2
h
0;1 + fW0=2i and
y 2
h
0;2 + fW0=2i.
Suppose that lobby 0 o¤ers x and y respectively to legislator i = 1; 2. Given the equilib-
rium strategy of lobby 1 expected payo¤ of lobby 0 is calculated as
E [U0 jx; y ] = 1
2
(W0   x  y)F 11 (x 1) 
1
2
y
 
1  F 11 (x 1)

+
1
2
(W0   x  y)F 12 (y  2) 
1
2
x
 
1  F 12 (y  2)

= 0:
So, E [U0 jx; y ] does not depend on x and y, i.e. lobby 0 achieves the same expected
payo¤ for any pair of o¤ers x and y, each of which is less or equal to i + fW0=2. Thus,
lobby 0 is willing to randomize in the described manner as well as lobby 1.
Note that in this Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies, lobby 0 gets an expected payo¤
equal to 0, which is the same as if it had no opportunity to bid for votes or as in the case
of the Stackelberg equilibrium. In contrast, lobby 1 earns a positive expected surplus equal
to W1   fW02 which is equal to W1   W02 when 1 = 2 = 0 . This payo¤ is larger than the
payo¤ W1   W0 that it gets in the Stackelberg equilibrium. This conrms that restoring
more balance between the two lobbyists leads to an increase of the payo¤ of the stronger
lobby.
On the other hand, in this equilibrium, the outcome is random. The e¢ cient policy is
chosen if the o¤er of lobby 0 to a contested legislator i does not exceed the o¤er of lobby 1
by an amount equal to Wi. Otherwise, the ine¢ cient policy is chosen. The probability P
of selecting the e¢ cient outcome is given by :
P  Pr (Lobby 1 wins) (3)
=
W1 +
fW0
2
W1
+
fW0
2
+W1
W1
ln
fW0
2
+W1fW0 +W1 +
fW0
2
+W2
W1
ln
fW0
2
+W2fW0 +W2
The computation of P proceeds stepwise. The probability of lobby 1s success, given the
fact that it o¤ers x to legislator 1 is Pr (M1 wins jx; 0) = F 01 (x+1). Using the distribution
of x it is easy to show that :
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Pr (lobby 1 wins jlegislator 1 is bribed)
=
2fW0 +2W1  
fW0
2
W1
+
Z gW0
2
0
W1   fW02 + x
W1
fW0 + 22fW0 +2   x2dx
We compute similarly the probability that lobby 1 wins given that legislator 2 is bribed.
Note further that :
@P
@1
=

2W1
ln
(W0 +1  2) (W0  1)
(W0  1 +2) (W0  2) +
2
2W1 (W0  1)
It follows that if 1 = 2, then @P@1 > 0 since the rst term is equal to zero. If 1 = 0;
then @P
@1
= 
2W1

ln W0
W0+2
+ 
W0

.
4 Political Uncertainty
In this section, we analyse the lobbying game under political uncertainty in the case where
the simple game is the majority game with an odd number n = 2k + 1 of legislators. We
assume that the types i of the legislators are independently and identically distributed
from a continuous cumulative distribution function22 F with bounded support [; ] where
0   < . We denote by f the probability density function, which is assumed to be strictly
positive on the whole interval [; ]. Finally, we assume that the hazard rate F
f
is increasing
and that the hazard rate 1 F
f
is decreasing.
4.1 The Optimal Strategy of Lobby 0 when Lobby 1 is Inactive
We rst consider the case where lobby 1 is inactive23 i.e. T 1 = 0. This an important
benchmark to start our exploration of the competition between the two lobbies. In such
context, the strategic interaction with the other lobby disappears and the game becomes
merely an agency problem with adverse selection where the principal is lobby 0 and the
agents are the n legislators. The conict of interest arises from our assumption that, without
compensation, legislators would vote for policy 1. The contractual problem faced by lobby 0
amounts to the selection of a vector T0 2 <n+ conditional on veriable information. Given our
22Therefore, the probability that any legislator has a type less than or equal to some  is F ().
23Some authors simply ignore the existence of several lobbies and the competitive aspect resulting from
that. One possible justication in our context consists in saying that lobby 1 cannot overcome its own
collective action di¢ culties and act e¢ ciently with respect to its own global stake.
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observability assumptions, this information consists of the n-dimensional vector of individual
votes. In principle, lobby 0 could make the payment to legislator i contingent upon the votes
of other legislators as well or a general statistic depending upon the all prole of votes. We
assume here that the reward to legislator i is simply based on his own vote : legislator i
receives ti0 if and only if he voted against the bill. This excludes, for instance, the ingenious
contractual solution of Dal Bo (2002) where a given legislator is paid only in the event where
his vote has been decisive.
The rest of this section is devoted to a complete analysis of this principal-agent(s) problem
i.e. to a characterization of the main features of the optimal strategy T 0 . We will denote
by n0 the number of legislators who have been promised to receive bribes by lobby 0 in the
optimal strategy i.e. :
n0  # fi 2 N : ti0 > 0g
This is an important feature of the strategy as it provides an answer to the question:
how large is the supermajority bought by lobby 0 ? A second feature is the total amount of
dollars paid by lobby 0. From its perspective, this is a risky prospect, as it does know since
when the o¤ers are made, it does not know for surewill be the behavioral response of the
legislators. Therefore, the amount M0 
P
i2N t

i0 just represents the upper bound of the
range of this random variable. Other parameters of interest are the rst E0 and second V

0
moments of this random variable. The expected rate of return of this investmentis then
given by :
W0   E0
E0
The third and last feature of the strategy that deserves to be investigated is the distrib-
ution of M0 across legislators. We have seen in section 3 that, when the simple game is not
symmetric i.e. when some legislators are more powerful than others, i.e. when they are not
perfect substitutes, we should expect some di¤erentials in the way they will be treated by the
lobbies. However, when the game is symmetric, they are all o¤ered the same amount. Our
assumption that the legislators are all identical ex ante together with the fact that the major-
ity game is summetric suggest that it will happen here too. This is not straightforward and
calls for a proof as the behavioral responses of the legislature following any possible history
of o¤ers is now more complicated. In case where uniformity across the bribed legislators is
shown to be optimal, we can, without loss of generality, limit ourselves to strategies dened
by two dimensions : an integer n0 and a real number t

0.
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4.1.1 The Voting Subgame(s)
Given any prole of o¤ers T0, a Bayesian strategy for legislator i in the continuation voting
subgame is a mapping i from the set of types [; ] into f0; 1g : i(T0; i) = 0 means that
legislator i votes for the status quo when T0 is the vector of standing o¤ers and his type is
i.
A key determinant of legislator i strategic evaluation is the probability pi of being pivotal.
Legislator i of type i with an o¤er equal to ti0 votes for the status quo if and only if
ti0 + piiW0  piiW1
The Bayesian decision rule is therefore described by a cut point bi : legislator i votes for
the status quo if his type i is below the cutpoint and votes for the reform otherwise. The
cut point bi is dened as
bi = max;min ti0
piW
; 

(4)
Let N0  fi 2 N : ti0 > 0g. Under the restriction that o¤ers are uniform i.e. ti0  t0 for
all i 2 N0, all legislators in N0 face the same decision problem. Hereafter, we will restrict
our attention here to symmetric equilibria i.e. we assume that these legislators use the
same decision rule. We will denote by b the cut point describing this strategy and by p the
probability of being pivotal for any of them. For the legislators outside N0, voting for the
reform is a dominant strategy
For any legislator i in N0 the probability p of being pivotal is simply the probability that
exactly k other legislators vote for 0. Since the legislators in N n N0 always vote for the
reform, this is the probability of the event that exactly k legislators from N0 n fig vote for
the status quo. Given the cut point b, it is possible to write down explicitly the formula for
p :
p = p(t0; n0; b) = Bk [n0   1; F (b)] (5)
where Bk [n; q] = Cknq
k(1   q)N k denotes the probability of the event k for a binomial
random variable with parameters n and q. The pivotal probability depends upon the voting
strategies played by the other legislators. The equilibrium pivotal probability will be solution
of ? when b is the equilibrium cut point. Since the equilibrium cut point is itself dependent
upon the equilibrium pivotal probability, we are left with an existence issue which is covered
by the following proposition24.
24A game with similar features has been examined by Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985) as describing the
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Proposition 4 For any given t0  0 and n0, the continuation voting subgame has two
interior symmetric equilibria < bL < bR <  and  as a corner equilibrium. The low cut
point equilibrium bL Pareto dominates25 the two other equilibria.
Proof:
The proof of the rt assertion is divided into two cases.
(i) n0 = k + 1, i.e. the lobby o¤ers positive transfers to a simple majority of voters. In
this case, the unique cut-o¤ level exists. Applying (5) one gets that p = F k(b). Substituting
it into (4) it follows that for t 2 (;1) b = , and for t 2 [0;] the cut point b is
dened by bF k(b) = t= (6)
From assumptions on the distribution function it follows that the LHS of this equality is
strictly increasing function of b, therefore b is uniquely dened by (6). One can see that b
is increasing function of t.
(ii) n0 > k + 1, i.e. the number of voters receiving positive o¤ers from the lobby is more
than a simple majority.
In this case there can be 3, 2 or 1 equilibrium cut-o¤ levels. From (5) the probability of
being pivotal is
Ckn0 1F
k(b)(1  F (b))n0 1 k.
First, let us consider function bF k(b)(1   F (b))n0 1 k. One can see that on the interval
[; ] it is nonnegative: it is equal to zero at  and , and it is strictly positive elsewhere on
the interval. It has exactly one maximum at N0 2 (; ), where N0 is dened from
@
@

F k()(1  F ())n0 1 k = 0:
To see that N0 is uniquely dened on the interval (; ) lets rewrite the derivative as
F ()(1  F ())

1

+ k
f
F
()  (n0   1  k) f
1  F ()

:
From the assumptions it follows that the function in the brackets is monotonically decreasing,
and for !  it approaches to +1 and for !  it approaches to  1. Therefore, it can
be equal to zero exactly at one point N0 2 (; ). For convenience let
t0 = C
k
n0 1
F k()(1  F ())n0 1 k:
decision to vote in an election given that voters incur a private cost to do so. In their model voters compare
this cost to the expected di¤erential benet. They also face the issue of multiplicity of equilibria.
25Some warning is needed about what we mean by Pareto dominance. Precisely, we refer to unanimity in
restriction to the coalition N0 of legislators. It represents a way to solve the coordination issue faced by
this subset of players.
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From (4), (5) if t0 = t0; b = N0, if t0 2 [0; t0) there are two solutions for bL and bR dened
by
F k()(1  F ())n0 1 k = t0
Ckn0 1
(7)
and for all t0 2 (0;1) there is also solution b = .
Consider now the second assertion. The expected utility of agent n is
Un(n; b =  P 1(b)nW1 + (1  P 1(b))nW0; for n  bP 0(b)nW0 + (1  P 0(b))nW1 + t0; for n  b ;
where P 1 = Pr(at least k from the other n0   1 agents choose 1) and
P 0 = Pr(at least k from the other n0   1 agents choose 0).
First, let us consider the case n  b. Expected utility can be written as Un(n; b) =
nW1  P 0(b)n + t0.
Probability P 0 can be written as
P 0(b) = n0 1X
i=k
Cin0 1F
i(b) (1  F (b))n0. 1 i :
From lemma 1 in the appendix, it follows that
@P 0
@b = f(b)(n0   k)Ck 1n0 1F k(b)(1  F (b))n0 1 k  0:
Thus, P 0(b) is increasing and expected utility is decreasing in b: Therefore Un(n; bL) 
Un(n; bR), i.e. in equilibrium bL utility of each agent n is at least as high as in equilibriumbR. The case n  b is similar.
In solving backward the all game, we solve each terminal voting subgames following a
pair (t0; n0) by considering the equilibrium bL = bL(t0; n0) which will be denoted simplyb = b(t0; n0) without risk of confusion.
4.1.2 The Optimal O¤er of Lobby 0
We are now in position to investigate the two dimensions of the optimal strategy of lobby
0. Given t0 and N0, the probability of accepting the bribe by any legislator in n0 is simply
F (b) and the probability of success for the lobby 0 is G(t0; n0) = Pn0j=k+1Bj [n0; F (b)].
Therefore, the expected payo¤ of the lobby 0 is (t0; n0) = G(t0; n0)W0   n0F (b)t0. The
following proposition describes the optimal amount of the o¤er t0 when lobby 0 buy a minimal
winning coalition.
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Proposition 5 When n0 = k + 1, the equilibrium o¤er t0 is uniquely dened:
t0 = 0 for W0 2 [0; N0];
t0 = aF
k(a)W < W where  2 (; ) is the unique solution to the equation : W 0  
n0aW =
F (a)
f(a)
W for W0 2

n0; n0+
W
f()

;
t = W  for W0 2
h
n0W +
W
f()
;+1

Proof. In this case the expected payo¤ of the lobby is dened by (k + 1; t0) =
F k+1(b) (W0   (k + 1)b). Since the cut-o¤ level b(t0) is increasing function it is possi-
ble to substitute for t0 from the second stage problem and to maximize with respect tob.
@
@b = (k + 1)F k(b) [f(b)(W0   (K + 1)b) F (b)] = 0
First, consider W0   (k + 1)b = F (b)f(b). By assumption Ff is increasing, therefore the
RHS is increasing function of b, and the LHS is decreasing. Therefore, these two functions
can intersect at most once on the interval (; ). It is easy to see that interior solution
a 2 (; ) exists only if W0   (k + 1) > 0 and W0   (k + 1) < f() .
Summing up, there are three cases:
If (k + 1) < W0 < (k + 1)+ f() the cut point is a 2 (; ) dened by W0   (k +
1)a = F (a)
f(a)
; @
@b > 0 for b < a and @@b < 0 for b > a.
In case 0 < W0 < (k+1) the cut point is  since @@b < 0 on the whole interval (; ).
If W0   (k + 1) > f() the cut point is  since @@b > 0 on (; ).
Of course, it is not necessarily optimal for lobby 0 to buy a minimal winning coalition.
It may prefer to buy a supermajority. Given the fact that the function  is continuous with
respect to t0 and that n0 takes a nite number of values, an optimal strategy is always well
dened. It remains however that the derivation of general results concerning this policy
are di¢ cult to derive. The results that follow o¤er some preliminary insights in some more
structured settings.
Proposition 6 Assume that F is the uniform distribution on the interval [0; 1] and that
n = 3. Then there exists  2 2
3
; 1

such that :
(i) n0 = 2 i¤ W0  387 W
(ii) If W0 2 [0; W ] ; then M0 = 3t(1) where 1  3W+W0 
p
9W 2 10WW0+(W0)2
8W
:
(iii) If W0 2

; 38
7


, then M0 =
8
9
W:
(iv) If W0 2

38
7
;+1, then M0 = 2W:
Proof. (i) n0 = 2: (k + 1; ) = 2(W0   2).
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For W0 2 [0; 3] function (k + 1; ) reaches its maximum at a = W0= (3). Corre-
sponding transfer t = t(a) = (W0)
2
9
and (k + 1; a) = (W0)
3
272
< ;
For W0 2 (3;+1) function (k + 1; ) is increasing on the whole interval, therefore
the maximum point is 1. Corresponding transfer t =  and (k + 1; 1) = W0   2 > .
(ii) n0 = 3:
In this case  = 2=3.
(k + 2; ) = 3W0 + 3(1  )(k + 1; ).
(k + 2; ) = 4
9
 
5
3
W0   43

.
The roots of the equation @(k+2;)
@
= 0 are dened by
1;2 =
3+W0 
q
92   10W0 + (W0)2
8
. (8)
If the discriminant is non-negative (k+2; ) reaches its maximum at 1 (the smallest root)
and its minimum at 2 (the largest root).
@(k+2;)
@
> 0 on the whole interval [0; ] in the following two cases: for W0 2 [; 9]
since the discriminant is non-positive, and for W0 2 (9;+1) since 1 > 1.
Therefore, for W0 2 (;+1) (k + 2; ) reaches its maximum at . Optimal transfer
t = 8
27
 and (k + 2; ) = 4
27
(5W0   4).
It remains to consider three cases in turn.
1.  W0 2 (0;). Function (k + 2; ) reaches its maximum on the interval [0; ]
either at 1 or  and (k + 1; ) reaches its maximum on [0; 1] at a. One can
check that 1  a and (k + 1; )  (k + 2; ) on [0; 1] (the proof is proved
in more general case in the next section). Therefore, n0 = 3 and maximum point
is either 1 or . More precisely, for W0 2 (0; 2=3) maximum point is 1 since
2 > 
. Since 2 is decreasing in W 0 for W 0  2=3 minimum point 2 < .
 W0 2 (; 3). It is always the case that (k + 1; a)  (k + 2; ).
 W0 2 (3;+1). It is necessary to compare (k + 1; 1) and (k + 2; ). It
follows that (k + 1; 1)  (k + 2; ) for W0  387  and the opposite inequality
is true otherwise.
The strategy of lobby 0 described in proposition ? displays an interesting feature. Not
surprisingly, the larger is the stake W0, the more money the lobby spends to buy votes.
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What is more intringing however, is that this money is on less legislators i.e. the size of the
coalition to which o¤ers are made becomes smaller. These are two equilibrium predictions
in the above special setting. They suggest the following two general questions.
 Is it the case, that lobbying activities are normal goods i.e. exhibiting positive income
e¤ects ?
 Is it the case that the size of the coalition of legislators approached by the lobby decreases
as the stake becomes larger ?
We strongly suspect that the answers to these two questions is yes when F is the uniform
distribution on the interval [0; 1]. Precisely, we think that the following assertion is true but
have not been able to prove it in full generality for the moment.
There exist thresholds w(m), m = k + 1; :::; n0, such that w(m) is decreasing in m and
such that n0 = m for W0 2 [w(m); w(m  1)]. That is, starting with small values of W0
lobbying group prefers to bribe all members of the committee (n0 = n) and with the increase
of W0 it bribes less and less members bribing just simple majority for rather large values.
Figures 2, 3, 4 and 5 suggest the plausibility of such pattern. The following two propo-
sitions are additional pieces of evidence in defense of that conjecture.
Proposition 7 Assume that F is the uniform distribution on the interval [0; 1]. Let n0 de-
notes the optimal cut point when lobby 0 restricts itself to a coalition of size n0.The following
statements hold true :
(i) n0 is decreasing with respect to n0.
(ii) If W0  (k + 2)W , then for any n0 > k + 1; the function (n0; ) is increasing in
 on the whole interval

0; n0

.
(iii) (n0 + 1; ) > (n0; ) for any  2

0; n0+1

and such that (n0; )  0:
Proof.
1. For the case of uniform distribution N0 =
K+1
N0
.
2. The expected payo¤ can be written as
(K + 1; ) = K+1 (W 0   (K + 1)).
For N0 > K + 1 (N0; ) =
CK+1N0 
K+1 (1  )N0 K 1 (W 0   (K + 1)) +W 0PN0k=K+2CkN0k (1  )N0 k or
(N0; ) = C
K+1
N0
(1  )N0 K 1(K + 1; ) +W 0
N0X
k=K+2
CkN0
k (1  )N0. k : (9)
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Taking derivative of (9) with respect to  we get
@(N0;)
@
= CK+1N0 (1  )N0 K 1 @(K+1;)@  
  (N0  K   1)CK+1N0 (1  )N0 K 2(K + 1; )+
+W 0 @
@
PN0
k=K+2C
k
N0
k (1  )N0. k

.
Substituting for (K + 1; ) from (9) and using lemma 1 of appendix to simplify the
last term one obtains
@(N0; )
@
= CK+1N0 (1  )N0 K 2

(1  ) @(K + 1; )
@
+ (N0  K   1) (K + 1)K+2

.
(10)
It follows that @(N0;)
@
 0 for W 0  (K + 2) since @(K+1;)
@
 0. One can also
notice from (10) that if a(N0) is a maximum point of (N0; ) then necessarily a(N0) 
a(K + 1) for any N0 > K + 1.
3. (N0+1; ) (N0; ) = CK+1N0 (1  )N0 K 1(K+1; ) (K+1) (N0+1)N0 K +W 0
PN0
k=K+2C
k
N0
k (1  )N0. k 1 k (N0+1)
N0+1 k +
W 0N0+1.
k   (N0 + 1)  0 for any   (N0 + 1) and k  K + 1.
From (9) it follows that (N0; )  0 is equivalent to
CK+1N0 (1  )N0 K 1(K + 1; )   W 0
PN0
k=K+2C
k
N0
k (1  )N0. k. Substituting
this into the previous expression one gets
(N0 + 1; )  (N0; ) 
W 0
PN0
k=K+2C
k
N0
k (1  )N0. k 1
h
(N0+1)
N0+1 k (1  ) 
(N0+1)
N0+1 K (1  )
i
+W 0N0+1 > 0.
Remark 1 It can be shown that for W 0 < (K + 2) function (N0; ) can have one
interior maximum and one interior minimum. From (10) @(N0;)
@
= 0 is equivalent to
(N0 + 1)
2   (W 0 + (K + 2))   W 0 = 0. It follows that maximum point a(N0) is
increasing in N0 and minimum point is decreasing.
The next proposition shows that if lobby 0 buys a minimal winning coalition, then the
stake must be larger than some minimal threshold. More precisely
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Proposition 8 Assume that F is the uniform distribution on the interval [0; 1]. A necessary
condition for n0 = k + 1 is :
W0  e  1
e  2(k + 1)W
Proof. In order to get the result I compare max2[0;1](K +1; ) and max2[0;N0 ]
(K +
2; ).
First, one can notice that @(K+1;)
@
= (K +1)K (W 0   (K + 2)). Therefore, (K +
1; ) is increasing on [0; 1] if W 0  (K + 2) and otherwise it has maximum at a(K + 1) =
W 0
(K+2)
. Second, if (K + 2; ) has maximum at some a(K + 2) < N0, then necessarily
a(K+2) > a(K+1). It follows from the fact that @(K+2;)
@
= (K+2)(1 )@(K+1;)
@
+(K+
2)(K+1)K+2. Therefore, @(K+2;)
@
= 0 if and only if (1 )@(K+1;)
@
=  (K+1)K+2 <
0.
 W 0  (K + 2).
According to the previous result function (K + 1; ) reaches its maximum at  = 1
and (K + 2; ) - at N0 .
(K + 1; 1) = W 0   (K + 1) and
(K + 2; (K + 2)) =W 0
 
K+1
K+2
K+1
+
 
K+1
K+2
K+2  (K + 1)  K+1
K+2
K+2
.
(K + 1; 1)  (K + 2; (K + 2)) =
W 0

1  2x 1
x 1
 
1  1
x
x  (K + 1) 1   1  1
x
x
, where x = K + 2  3.
For x  3 function (x) =  1  1
x
x
is positive and increasing with
limx!1 (x) = 1=e. Function g(x) =
1 (x)
1  2x 1
x 1 (x)
is decreasing, g(x) > 0 for x  3
and limx!1 g(x) = e 1e 2 . Thus, (K + 1; 1)   (K + 2; (K + 2)) > 0 i¤ W 0 >
(K + 1)g(K + 2) and e 1
e 2 < g(x) < 19=7.
 W 0  (K + 2).
(K +1; ) reaches its maximum at a(K +1) < 1. (K +2; ) is either increasing on
the whole interval

0; N0

or its maximum is at a(K + 2) < N0 .
If (K+2; ) has maximum at a(K+2) then a(K+2) > a(K+1) and from proposition
??(K+2; a(K+2)) (K+1; a(K+1))  (K+2; a(K+1)) (K+1; a(K+1)) > 0.
Lets (K + 2; ) is increasing on the whole interval. Then the following is true
(K + 2; (K + 2)) (K + 1; a(K + 1))  (K + 2; (K + 2)) (K + 1; 1) < 0
if W 0 > (K + 1)g(K + 2).
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4.2 The Optimal Strategy of Lobby 0 when Lobby 1 is active
In this section, we return to the game theoretical framework i.e. we take into account the
lobbying or counterlobbying strategy of lobby 1. As in the preceding section, we disregard
the possibility for a lobby to o¤er di¤erent o¤ers to those who receive o¤ers and we denote
by (t0; n0 ) and (t1; n1 ) the respective (pure) strategies of lobby 0 and lobby 1. It should
observed that the two-player game describing this competition is quite unusual as the sets
of pure strategies of the players are non convex subsets of the (n   1)-dimensional unitary
simplex26 as illustrated on gure 1. This implies that the equilibrium analysis will be rather
intricate and requires a specic treatment. We rst explore the nature of the best responses
functions of the two lobbies.
Insert Figure 1 about here
Given a prole ((t0; n0 ) ; (t1; n1 )) of lobbying strategies, the legislators are partitioned
into three groups:
 The group N0 incudes the legislators who have received an o¤er exclusively from lobby
0.
 The group N01 incudes the legislators who have received an o¤er from both lobbies.
 the group N n (N0 [N01) of legislators who did not receive any o¤er.
Note that at equilibrium, no legislator will receive a positive o¤er from lobby 1 exclusively
as this would be from its perspective a wasteful investment.
4.2.1 The Voting Subgame(s)
As before, in solving continuation voting subgames, we restrict our attention to symmetric
equilibria i.e. all legislators in similar position follow the same decision rule.The legislators
in group N0 will be dscribed by the cut point b while those in N01 will be described by the
cut point b. Let us denote by p0 and p01 the probability of being pivotal for a legislator in
N0 and N01 respectively. Then, the cut points are dened as
b = max;min t0
p0W
; 

, (11)
and b = max;min t0   t1
p01W
; 

. (12)
The dominant strategy of legislators in N n (N0 [N01) is to vote for the reform.
26This follows, of course from our uniformity assumption.
26
For any legislator i in N0 [N01 the probability of being pivotal is simply the probability
that exactly k other agents vote for 0. It is equal the probability that exactly k agents
from (N0 [N01) n fig vote for 0. Given the cut points b and b, it is possible to write down
explicitly the formula for the probabilities of being pivotal:
p0(N0; N01; b; b) = min(k;n0 1)X
r=max(0;k n01)
Br [n0   1; F (b)]Bk r hn01; F (b)i , (13)
A similar expression is derived for p01(N0; N01; b; ). The continuation voting subgames
are more complicated to analyse than before as there are now a pair of equations and two
variables b and b to be determined.
4.2.2 The Optimal Strategies of Lobbies 0 and 1
We o¤er some preliminary but incomplete insights in the case where F is the uniform dis-
tribution on the interval [0; 1] and n = 3.There are seven possible cases according to the
number of agents belonging to each of three groups N0, N01 and N n (N0 [N01). They are
denoted by 201, 300, 210, 120, 111, 021, 030. For example,case 201 describes the situation in
which two legislators receive an o¤er from the lobbying group 0 and the third one does not
receive o¤er at all. The rst two regimes, namely 201 and 300 bring us back to the previous
situation, in which only lobbying group M0 is active.
We are primarily interested in the best response of lobby 0 to the strategy of lobby 1.
The following table describes the possible regimes r for lobby 0 given (t1; n1 ).
(1; t1) (2; t1) (3; t1)
210 120 030
111 021
For each r it is possible to calculate the best response t0(t1) and alsor(t1) = 0r(t0(t1); t1).
Then, given (n1; t1), the reaction t0(t1) of lobby 0 maximizes r(t1).
Case 1 : 210
 Pivotal probabilities are dened by
p0 =  (1  ) +  (1  )
p01 = 2 (1  )
Then, the second stage solutions  (t0; t1) and  (t0; t1) are dened from the following
system
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8<:  = max
n
0;min
n
t0
[(1 )+(1 )] ; 1
oo
 = max
n
0;min
n
t0 t1
2(1 ) ; 1
oo (14)
 Suppose that ;  2 (0; 1). Eliminating  from the system, one can express t0 through
 and t1:
t0 = 22 (1  )  t1 (1  2) (15)
 Lobbying group 0 maximizes:
0210 =
 
2 + 2 (1  )W 0   t0 (2+ ) (16)
We take the grid for t1 consisting from 100 points and for each value of t1 calculate t0; 
and 0210 a functions of . On the interval [0; 1], equation (22) may dene two solutions for
t0 () one of which is decreasing in  and the other is decreasing. It is more intuitive that
a larger amount of bribe from lobby 0 corresponds to a higher probability for a legislator
to accept the bribe and to vote against the reform. Therefore we consider the increasing
solution.
We maximize the function 0210 with respect to  on the interval where t
0 () is positive
and increasing. Below the graphs of the functions (22) and (23) are di¤erent values of t1
and W 0 =  = 1.As we can see the function 0210 () may have two local maxima on the
considered interval. For small values of t1, the function 0210 () reaches its maximum in
the right bounadary of the interval (gure 10). With an increase of t1, the point where the
maximal is reached moves to the left : rst to the higher and the then to the lower local
maximum point (gures 11, 12). We can have a situation where the maximum is reached at
both points.
Case 2 : 120 is symmetric with respect to  and  to the previous case. Therefore, the
analysis is very similar.
Case 3 : 111 cannot appear at the equilibrium since the system for the second-stage
solution is consistent if and only if t1 = 0:
 The system for the second-stage solution is consistent if and only if t1 = 0:
8<:  = max
n
0;min
n
t0

; 1
oo
 = max
n
0;min
n
t0 t1

; 1
oo
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Then, we are back to the case 201.
Case 4 : 021
 The second-stage solution (t0; t1) is dened by 2 = t0 t1

for t
0 t1

2 (0; 1);  = 0 or
1 if t
0 t1

< 0 or t
0 t1

> 1 respectively.
At the rst stage each lobbying group maximizes its expected payo¤:
0021 = 
2W 0   2t0
Case 5 : 030
 The second-stage solution is given by :
22 (1  ) = t
0   t1

LHS is increasing in t0 and decreasing in t1 on the interval [0; 2=3]. Similar to the previous
case, we take the grid for t1 and express t0 as a function of . The expected payo¤ of lobby
0 is given by :
0030 =
 
22 (1  ) + 3W 0   3t0
It is maximized for  2 0; 2
3

since the function t0 () is increasing on this interval and
decreasing on

2
3
; 1

.
5 Appendix
5.1 A Technical Lemma
Lemma 1 The Function U(n0;m; ) =
Pn0
k=mC
k
n0
F ()k (1  F ())n0 k,
where m < n0 is increasing with respect to  and n0. More precisely,
@U(n0;m; )
@
= (n0 + 1 m)f()Cm 1n0 Fm 1() (1  F ())n0 m (17)
and
U(n0 + 1;m; )  U(n0;m; ) = Cm 1n0 Fm() (1  F ())n0+1 m . (18)
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Proof. @U(N0;m;)
@
=
f()
PN0 1
k=m C
k
N0
h
kF k 1() (1  F ())N0 k   (N0   k)F k() (1  F ())N0 k 1
i
+N0f()F
N0 1().
Substituting for kCkN0 = (N0   (k   1))Ck 1N0 one gets that this is equivalent to
f()
PN0 1
k=m (N0   (k   1))Ck 1N0 F k 1() (1  F ())N0 k 
f()
PN0 1
k=m C
k
N0
(N0   k)F k() (1  F ())N0 k 1 +N0f()FN0 1().
In the two sums all term except the rst and the last ones are cancelled out. Thus,
@U(N0;m;)
@
= (N0 + 1 m)f()Cm 1N0 Fm 1() (1  F ())N0 m.
U(N0 + 1;m; )  U(N0;m; ) =PN0+1
k=m C
k
N0+1
F k() (1  F ())N0+1 k  PN0k=mCkN0F k() (1  F ())N0 k. After applying
CkN0+1 = C
k
N0
+ Ck 1N0 this di¤erence is equal to
F ()N0+1 +
PN0
k=mC
k
N0
F k() (1  F ())N0+1 k +PN0k=mCk 1N0 F k() (1  F ())N0+1 k  PN0
k=mC
k
N0
F k() (1  F ())N0 k. Summing up the rst and the third sums it is equivalent
to
F ()N0+1 PN0k=mCkN0F k+1() (1  F ())N0 k+PN0k=mCk 1N0 F k() (1  F ())N0+1 k. One
can notice that in the two sums all the terms except the rst and the last ones are cancelled
out. Therefore, we get (18).
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